The Johnson Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1963–1967
Lyndon Johnson's presidency saw a transformation of America's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Until the early 1960s, the United States adhered to the terms of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, in which the United States, the United Kingdom, and France pledged to prevent aggression by Middle Eastern states and oppose regional arms races. The United States urged Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip after Suez, and rejected Israeli requests for all but a limited amount of defensive weapons. By the time Johnson took office, however, American politicians had concluded that this policy was no longer sustainable. Soviet arms sales to leftist Arab states, especially Egypt, threatened to erode Israel's military superiority. Johnson's advisers feared that if the United States did not offset this shift in the balance of power, Israeli leaders might launch a pre-emptive war or develop nuclear weapons.
Initially, the Johnson administration tried to convince Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Soviet leadership to work toward a regional arms control system, but neither side was receptive. Thus, Johnson agreed to sell the M48A3 tank to Israel in 1965, followed by the A-4 Skyhawk in 1966. According to National Security Council staffer Robert Comer, the rationale behind the sales was that "the Arabs knew they couldn't win the NSC." An arms race against Israel should help calm the Arab-Israeli conflict in the long run. "
Pre-war crisis
On May 13, 1967, Soviet officials informed the Syrian and Egyptian governments that Israel had massed troops on the Syrian border. Although the report was false, Nasser sent a large number of Egyptian troops to the Sinai anyway. On May 16, Egypt demanded that the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which has been deployed in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip since 1957, withdraw from Israel's borders. Secretary-General U Thant responded that he would have to withdraw UNEF from all its positions, including Sharm al-Shaykh, which would put political pressure on Nasser to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Nasser remained adamant and announced on 22 May that he would close the strait after UNEF withdrew. In 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower promised that the United States would consider closing the strait an act of war. Johnson now had three unwelcome options: renege on Eisenhower's pledge, acquiesce to an Israeli attack on Egypt, or order American forces to reopen the waterway.
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